ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the impacts that three alternative damage apportionment rules have on an owner's financial-reporting decision, an auditor's audit-quality choice, and investors' pricing decisions within the context of a perfectly competitive securities market and owner solvency constraints. The strategic interactions between the players' strategies are analyzed within a setting where payoffs are endogenously determined and vary with the damage apportionment rule. These comparisons speak to potential changes resulting from the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 which replaced joint-and-several liability with a proportionate liability rule. The main finding is that the audit failure rate can decrease when there is a switch from a joint-and-several to a proportional liability rule despite the fact that audit quality has also declined. This result occurs when there are strategic interactions between the owner's reporting strategy and the auditor's quality decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
T he Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (U.S. Congress 1995) replaced the long-standing joint-and-several (JS) liability rule with a hybrid proportional liability rule (HP). Auditors had lobbied vigorously to eliminate JS liability claiming that they had frequently been included in lawsuits merely because of their ''deep pockets'' without regard to the merits of the case.
1 Palmrose (1994) finds evidence consistent with these claims. The auditing industry claimed that exposure to the large potential damage awards under the JS rule had forced them to accept excessively high settlements and could reduce the long-run supply of auditing. Supporters of the JS rule claimed that it led to higher levels of audit quality and offered more investor protection compared to proportional liability rules. This paper analyses how the strategies of owners, auditors and investors interact to determine the ex ante audit failure rate under three alternative damage apportionment rules: JS, HP, and a pure proportional (PP) rule (which is currently used in Canada). This paper focuses on the audit failure rate for three reasons: (1) regulators, auditors and investors are more likely to be concerned with the incidence of audit failures rather than with audit quality per se, (2) audit failures entail high costs in addition to the economic damages they cause, and (3) focusing on audit failures avoids specifying a particular audit cost function, which would be required if social welfare comparisons were to be made among the damage apportionment rules.
The damage apportionment rule determines who is responsible when a co-defendant is unable to pay his/her entire share of the damages. If all of the co-defendants are always able to pay their share of the damages after the trial, then there are no differences between the damage apportionment rules because there are no unpaid damages to apportion. In order to highlight the impact of apportionment rules on both auditors and audit failure rates, I create an economic setting where the auditor is always solvent, but the original owner may be bankrupt by the end of the trial. The three damage apportionment rules analyzed in this paper can be compared along the dimension of how much owner insolvency insurance they require the auditor to provide investors. At one extreme is the JS rule which provides full insurance where liable auditors are held responsible for all unpaid damages regardless of their share of the blame. Thus, the auditor bears all of the owner's bankruptcy risk. At the other extreme is the PP rule, which provides no owner insolvency insurance so that a liable auditor is responsible for only the share of the damages that the jury holds him/her responsible for causing. Thus, investors completely self-insure the risk of owner bankruptcy. The HP rule lies in between these two extremes and requires that the liable auditor provide investors with a limited amount of owner insolvency insurance. The 1995 Reform Act established that a codefendant who is found liable is responsible for paying up to 50 percent more in damages over his/her initially assessed share if there is an unpaid portion of the damages and investors satisfy certain net worth and loss conditions.
3 When the auditor is not held liable for the audit failure, the investors must fully bear the risk of owner insolvency. This paper focuses on the owner's incentives to misreport and the auditor's incentives to detect it, and the interactions between them. This focus on the owner's reporting incentives has been missing from the auditor liability literature. The auditor knows that his/her strategy can affect the owner's reporting strategy and takes this into account when determining the optimal audit strategy. The owner is also aware of these strategic interactions 1 In the 1992 Big 6 Statement of Position, auditors argued that: ''The principal causes of the auditing profession's liability problems are unwarranted litigation and coerced settlements...and...the principal cause of unwarranted litigation against the profession is joint-and-several liability'' (Arthur Andersen et al. 1992, 1, 6 ). 2 I focus on the case of owner bankruptcy because Palmrose (1994) observes that 58 percent of all auditor litigation cases involve the financial failure / distress of the client while there have been only two major audit firm bankruptcies due to litigation exposure in the U.S. (Laventhol and Howarth; Spicer and Oppenheim) . 3 See King and Schwartz (1997) for more on the 1995 Reform Act. For simplicity, I assume that the net worth and loss conditions are always met.
and takes them into account when determining the optimal reporting strategy. Competitive investors rationally price the firm based on their conjectures of the other players' strategies and the endogenously determined liability payments, which are a function of the damage apportionment rule. This endogeneity is important because the damage apportionment rule influences investors' expected payoffs in the audit failure state, which are then incorporated into prices. These price differences will simultaneously change both the auditor's and the owner's payoffs, which are linked through the firm's price.
The existence of such strategic interactions between auditing and financial reporting has long been recognized by practitioners and has been empirically and experimentally documented in the accounting literature. Hanson and Watts (1997) use U.K. data to determine that an ''interactive'' game theory model describes the auditor/manager interaction better than a ''static'' decision theory model. Hirst (1994) provides experimental evidence indicating that auditors adjust their audit quality in response to managers' incentives to manipulate the financial statements. 4 Additionally, auditors evaluate management characteristics and other risk factors in order to assess the degree of inherent and control risk for a particular engagement. This indicates that auditors are well aware of managers' misreporting incentives and adjust their auditing procedures accordingly.
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This paper contributes to the auditor liability literature (examples include Dye 1993 Dye , 1995 Dye et al. 1990; Melumad and Thoman 1990; Narayanan 1994; Pae 1996; Schwartz 1997 ) that focuses on audit quality and the impact that various legal regimes and economic institutions have on it. A common feature of these papers is that owners/managers always employ static reporting strategies (i.e., they always report high). Since the owner's reporting choice never varies with the economic setting, the audit failure rate in these models is always decreasing with audit quality. Thus, the legal regime that leads to the highest level of audit quality will always lead to the lowest audit failure rate. Schwartz (1997) creates a setting with a perfectly scalable investment project and analyzes the impact of an economic damages measure on the amount invested in the project. Under an economic damages measure, the amount of damages that investors can sue for is equal to their ''out-of-pocket'' or capital losses.
6 In Schwartz's (1997) model, such a measure leads investors to over-invest in the project because the rule prevents investors from fully internalizing the investment's risk. In the model analyzed here, the economic damages measure results in a price premium (which is equivalent to the amount of over-investment in Schwartz's (1997) setting) that is largest (smallest) under the damage apportionment rule that provides the most (least) owner insolvency insurance. This paper extends the auditor liability literature in two ways. First, it explicitly analyzes how an owner's endogenously determined financial reporting choice is influenced by the damage apportionment rule and how that choice interacts with the auditor's and investors' strategies. Comparisons of auditing legal regimes in a setting with strategic misreporting by owners and discretionary variations in audit quality allow insights not permitted when the owner's reporting decision is fixed, because it is the interaction of audit quality 4 Dopuch et al. (1994) and Dopuch et al. (1997) show that experimental subjects employed mixed reporting strategies that varied with the legal regime and that investors adjusted prices to protect themselves in response to the changes in the owner's reporting strategy. 5 These risk assessment practices have recently been institutionalized by the AICPA (1997) in SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in Financial Statements, which identifies over 30 ''red flags'' that can assist auditors in assessing the risk of fraud. The standard requires auditors to adjust their auditing procedures in response to their fraud assessments. 6 This economic damages measure corresponds to the current U.S. legal environment. See Pae (1996) and Hillegeist (1998) for other models that incorporate an economic damages measure.
and the reporting decision that determines the audit failure rate. 7 Second, I find that in this expanded setting, it is no longer the case that the audit failure rate is always decreasing with audit quality. This result demonstrates the importance of explicitly bringing the owner's reporting decision into the analysis because which damage apportionment rule leads to the lowest audit failure rate depends on whether the owner's reporting strategy varies with the legal environment. This result is new to the auditor liability literature. This paper also complements the auditor judgment literature (examples include Fellingham and Newman 1985; Newman and Noel 1989; Shibano 1990 Shibano , 1994 ) that analyzes how the auditor's trade-off between Type I and II errors is influenced by the legal regime, while taking into account how this trade-off affects the owner's reporting strategy. These papers exogenously specify the payoffs for the owner/manager and assume that the amount of audit evidence is exogenously determined. The analysis in this paper instead focuses on how much audit evidence the auditor decides to collect in a setting where all of the players' payoffs are endogenously determined.
The next section describes the model and the sequence of events. Section III derives the equilibria under all three damage apportionment rules while section IV analyzes and compares the equilibria. Section V contains a discussion of possible extensions to the model and section VI concludes the paper. Appendix A provides a list of notation and appendix B contains the proofs.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In the United States' fixed audit fee environment, an auditor's motivation to provide privately observed audit quality comes from two primary sources: reputation concerns and legal liability. I abstract from reputation considerations by using a one-period model in order to focus on the legal system. This model examines how an auditor's motivation to supply hidden audit quality changes with the damage apportionment rule while taking into account how the owner's reporting strategy may also change. Figure 1 summarizes the game.
The model has three risk-neutral strategic players: a privately informed owner who is selling his firm, an auditor with a hidden action problem, and competitive investors who buy the firm and decide whether to fund its investment opportunity. I assume that there is a commonly known probability b ʦ (0, 1) that the owner will be bankrupt by the time damages are awarded at the end of the trial. In the event of an audit failure, a nonstrategic jury determines whether the auditor is liable, and if liable, apportions the blame between the auditor and the owner.
The economic setting involves an owner who is going to sell the entire firm to public investors for some exogenously specified reason (life-cycle, liquidity, etc.) at the beginning of the period. 8 The value of the firm's beginning-of-period assets (which I refer to as its type) can either be high (H) with probability p or low (L) with probability (1 Ϫ p). Additionally, each firm has an investment opportunity that must be funded by the investors shortly after the firm's sale or else it will become worthless. The investment opportunity 7 In Schwartz's (1997) ''over-investment'' setting, an additional consideration in comparing legal regimes is the amount of over / under investment they may induce. This concern cannot be separated from the audit failure rate because one will influence the other and vice versa. When the investment project is not scalable, then the only issue is the audit failure rate. 8 In addition to simplifying the analysis, this assumption avoids signaling complications; these have already been explored in Datar et al. (1991) among others. As long as signaling through retained ownership percentage does not fully reveal firm type, then the analysis can be interpreted as applying to those firms that form a particular partial pooling equilibrium. 
FIGURE 1 Game Tree
requires $I in funding and represents an expansion of the firm's existing operations so the project cannot be spun off as a separate entity. Investing in the high-type firm (low-type firm) will yield an end-of-period cashflow of C H (C L ). I assume that without any additional information, investors are willing to fund the project; that is, p⅐C H ϩ (1 Ϫ p)⅐C L Ͼ I. For simplicity, I normalize both the value of C L and the discount rate to equal zero. The economic setting described in this model is motivated by observations about ''hot IPO markets'' such as have taken place most recently in Internet-related firms. These firms are partially ''pre-screened'' by virtue of their existing operations and are in markets with enormous growth potential. Investors are willing to fund these risky ventures without waiting to acquire additional information because of large first-mover advantages and the huge potential rewards of investing in one of the eventual winners.
All auditors are assumed to be of the same quality, use the same audit technology and are paid a flat fee. Once hired, the owner provides the auditor with a private set of financial statements T ʦ {Ĥ , L } to audit, where Ĥ (L ) represents the financial statements of a hightype (low-type) firm.
9 It is always a dominant strategy for high-type owners to provide a high report to the auditor. Low-type owners report high percent of the time where ʦ [0, 1] is endogenously determined.
If the owner provides a low report, L , the auditor knows that it is accurate and issues an unqualified opinion after performing a minimum quality audit. If the owner reports high, Ĥ , the auditor proceeds to conduct an audit whose quality is the auditor's private information. The audit technology produces discrete, one-sided imperfect audit evidence; the auditor may discover errors if they exist, but cannot find or create them if they do not exist. The audit produces evidence t ʦ {â, û}, where â (û) indicates that (no) material misstatements were found and that the owner's high report, Ĥ , warrants an adverse, â, (unqualified, û) opinion. Let q ʦ [q, 1] represent the quality of an audit, where q Ն 0 represents a lower bound on audit quality. Quality is defined as the probability of discovering a material misstatement if one exists; that is, q ϭ pr [â͉Ĥ , L] . The auditor's incremental cost of providing audit quality q Ͼ q, c(q), is increasing and strictly convex in quality. Additionally, c(q) ϭ 0 and c(q) → ϱ as q → 1.
Since evidence of material misstatements is always correct in this model, the auditor will always issue an adverse opinion unless the owner changes the report from high, Ĥ , to low L . Since the Securities and Exchange Commission would prevent a firm with an adverse opinion from going public, the owner will always change the report and an unqualified low report (L , û) will be issued. However, an auditor with no evidence of material misstatements must decide which opinion to issue. Certifying a high report leaves the auditor vulnerable to a lawsuit by investors if the firm is actually of low type, while issuing an adverse opinion without evidence would leave the auditor vulnerable to a lawsuit by a high-type owner. In order to focus on the auditor's quality decision, I assume that an auditor's opinion will always be consistent with the audit evidence.
10 If no material misstatements are found during the audit of a high report, then the owner and the auditor will jointly issue an unqualified high report (Ĥ , û). Thus, only unqualified reports will be issued publicly in equilibrium. 9 This characterization of the auditing process corresponds closely to actual practice where the auditor only expresses an opinion on the financial statements provided by the owner / management, but does not produce an independent set of financial reports. 10 As long as the monetary and reputation costs of falsely issuing an adverse opinion are high enough (or equivalently, if the level of audit quality is high enough), it will always be a dominant strategy for the auditor to issue a report that is consistent with the evidence. I make the simplifying assumption of accurate reporting in order to avoid this extra level of complexity.
Investors price the firm based on the audited financial statements, (Ĥ , û) or (L , û), and their conjectures of the other players' equilibrium strategies. The price P that they pay for a firm with an audited high report is based on the expected value of the firm's future cash flows plus the expected litigation payments in the event of an audit failure. Based on the audited high report, the investors contribute an additional $I to fund the investment project shortly after the sale has been completed. If the firm issues an audited low report, the investors are certain that the firm is of low type. Therefore, the price is zero, the investment project is not undertaken and the game ends.
If the firm's end-of-period cash flow equals C H , the game ends because the high cash flow demonstrates that the audited high report was correct. An audit failure occurs when the end-of-period cash flow equals zero, since this shows that the firm is of low type. When this occurs, the investors will sue the owner and the auditor for damages. Since the lowtype owner committed a knowing violation of the securities laws, he will always be held joint-and-severally liable, which is in accordance with the 1995 Reform Act. During their deliberations, the jury first determines whether to hold the auditor liable for the audit failure by comparing their noisy observation of the audit's quality to their interpretation of the legally required ''due care'' level of audit quality. Since there is no explicit formulation of due care, each jury must determine whether the auditor has met this inherently vague standard. I operationalize this concept of vague liability by assuming that, in expectation, the jury finds the auditor negligent with probability , where ʦ (0, 1) is common knowledge.
If the jury holds the auditor liable, it then determines the relative fault of each defendant. This determination provides the initial basis of how the damages will be split between the auditor and owner. Since the jury has no clear formula or guidelines on how this should be done, I assume that, in expectation, the auditor (owner) is held responsible for ␣ (1 Ϫ ␣) percent of the damages, where ␣ ʦ (0,1) is common knowledge.
11 The damages are set equal to the investors' economic losses that resulted from their reliance on the fraudulent financial statements. Thus, the economic damages consist of the price P that was paid to the owner plus the $I used to fund the investment project. The actual damage payments investors ultimately receive depend on the solvency of the owner, the liability of the auditor, and the prevailing damage apportionment rule.
III. DERIVATION OF THE EQUILIBRIA
In this section, the equilibrium strategies for each player under the HP rule will be derived in detail because the other damage apportionment rules are just special cases of the HP rule. This derivation will be followed by a description of how the analyses for the JS and PP rules differ from the HP rule. The exogenous parameters (b, C H , I and p) and the legal regime parameters (␣, and k) are all common knowledge. The analysis proceeds by backward induction because of the game's sequential nature. First, the investors' pricing rule will be derived when an audited high report (Ĥ , û) is issued. If the investors observe an audited low report (L , û), they always take it as fully credible, price the firm at zero and do not undertake the investment project. Second, the auditor's optimal level of audit quality will be derived when a high private report is received from the owner. If the auditor receives a low report, the auditor takes it as fully credible, performs a minimum quality audit, and an unqualified low report is issued. Third, the low-type owner's optimal misreporting strategy will be characterized. It is always a dominant strategy for a high-type owner to report high. An equilibrium occurs when all three players' conjectures about the other players' strategies are correct, and no player can strictly increase their own expected payoff by changing their strategy.
Investors' Pricing Decision
The price competitive investors are willing to pay for a firm with an audited high report is based on the weighted sum of two mutually exclusive payoffs. The first payoff is equal to the liquidating cash flow of the high-type firm, C H , 12 weighted by the conjectured probability that there has not been an audit failure, g c . 13 Thus, the expected value of the first payoff is g c ⅐C H . The probability g c is a function of the conjectured probability that the lowtype owner reports high ( ) to calculate via Bayes' Rule, the posterior probability that a firm with an audited high report (Ĥ , û) is actually of high type (H):
The second payoff is equal to the litigation payments, EL I , that investors expect to receive from suing the owner and auditor in the event of an audit failure. Since the trial can result in one of four different outcomes, EL I will equal the weighted sum of the payments in each of these states. These payments and their respective probabilities are as follows: (1) with probability (1 Ϫ )(1 Ϫ b), the auditor is not found liable and the owner is solvent; therefore, the investors will recover all of their losses, (P HP ϩ I); (2) with probability (1 Ϫ )b, the auditor is not found liable and the owner is bankrupt; therefore, the investors will recover none of their losses; (3) with probability (1 Ϫ b), the auditor is held negligent and the owner is solvent; therefore, the investors will recover (P HP ϩ I); and (4) with probability b, the auditor is held negligent and the owner is bankrupt; therefore, the investors will recover only k␣ percent of their total losses, or ␣k(P HP ϩ I). It is only in this last case that differences arise between the damage apportionment rules. Since liability payments only occur when there has been an audit failure, the expected liability payments are weighted by (1 Ϫ g c ) ϭ pr(L͉Ĥ , û); the investors' conjectured probability that a firm with an audited high report is actually of low type. Summing up these terms and simplifying yields the investors' expected liability award:
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The sum of these two expected payoffs (g c ⅐C H ϩ (1 Ϫ g c )⅐EL I ) minus the $I that will be invested in the project equals the price competitive investors are willing to pay for a firm with an audited high report. Thus:
Auditor's Quality Decision Since the audit fee is fixed, the auditor will choose to supply the level of audit quality that minimizes the sum of the direct auditing costs and the amount of liability payments the auditor expects to make,
The auditor faces a potential liability payment whenever c EL .
A a high report from a low-type firm is given an unqualified opinion. This is expected to happen with probability
, which is the joint probability that the high report is from a low-type firm and that the auditor fails to detect the overstatement. This probability depends on the auditor's conjecture of the low-type owner's reporting strategy, c , and the actual quality of the audit performed, q. If the jury does not find the auditor liable for the audit failure, then the auditor will not be required to pay any damage awards. This happens with probability (1 Ϫ ). With probability , the jury determines that the auditor is responsible for ␣ percent of the investors' losses. The amount that the auditor actually pays depends on the owner's solvency status and the prevailing damage apportionment rule. If the owner is solvent (which occurs with probability (1 Ϫ b)), then the auditor will pay ␣(P HP ϩ I), but if the owner is bankrupt (which occurs with probability b), then the auditor will pay ␣k(P HP ϩ I), where k Ͼ 1. After simplifying and rearranging terms, the auditor's conjecture of the expected liability payments given a high report by the owner, is as follows:
where is the auditor's conjecture of the investors' pricing decision. c P HP The auditor's optimal choice of audit quality is the unique value of q that minimizes the sum of the auditor's incremental direct auditing costs and expected liability payments:
HP c p ϩ (1 Ϫ p)
Taking the derivative of equation (7) with respect to q and setting it equal to zero gives:
The unique value of q which satisfies equation (8) is the auditor's optimal choice of audit quality under the HP rule, At the auditor's marginal cost of additional audit quality q* . q* , HP HP just equals the marginal reduction in expected liability payments (i.e., the marginal benefit from audit quality).
Owner's Reporting Decision
If the low-type owner reports accurately, an audited low report (L , û) will always be received and the firm will be sold for the normalized price of zero. If the low-type owner misreports, the high report will receive an unqualified opinion with probability (1 Ϫ q c ), where q c represents the owner's conjecture of the auditor's quality decision. If the low-type owner successfully misreports, the expected benefits equal which is the owner's conc P , HP jecture of the investors' pricing decision. The solvent owner's expected costs for successfully misreporting depend on whether the jury finds the auditor liable. If the auditor is found liable, the owner will be responsible for paying (1 Ϫ ␣) percent of the investors' losses. This occurs with probability . If the auditor is not held liable, then the owner will be responsible for paying all of the investors' actual damages, (P HP ϩ I). This occurs with probability (1 Ϫ ). Combining terms yields the low-type owner's expected costs of misreporting:
c P HP The low-type owner will always misreport (report accurately) when the expected net benefits of misreporting are strictly positive (negative). When the net benefits equal zero, the owner will be indifferent between the two reporting choices and it will be a weakly dominant strategy to use a mixed or ''interactive'' reporting strategy. The low-type owner chooses (the probability of reporting high) to maximize the expected net benefits based on his/her conjectures of the investors' pricing decision and the auditor's quality . 14 M(␣) can be interpreted as the low-type owner's expected costs of misreporting and the firm's price as the expected benefits of misreporting. 15 The expected costs of misreporting, M(␣), decrease with ␣ because the solvent owner is being held responsible for a smaller percentage of the damages when the auditor is found liable.
Joint-and-Several and Pure Proportional Rules
The three damage apportionment rules can be characterized in terms of the proportional damage multiplier k. The higher k is, the less (more) owner-bankruptcy risk the investors (auditor) bear(s). At one extreme is the joint-and-several rule where the liable auditor is responsible for all of the owner's unpaid share of the damages. This is equivalent to a hybrid proportional rule where ␣k ϭ 1. At the other extreme is the pure proportional rule where the negligent auditor is only responsible for the original share of the damages when 14 When ϭ M(␣), the low-type owner is indifferent between the two reporting choices. Thus, the proposed c P HP equilibrium strategy * ϭ c is weakly dominant because no other value of can strictly increase the low-type owner's expected utility, taking the other players' strategies as given. At * ϭ c , the other players cannot gain by unilaterally changing their strategies, so the strategies derived above form a Nash equilibrium. Additionally, it can be shown that * ϭ c represents the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium. 15 This emphasis on the monetary costs in a civil trial understates the expected costs of misreporting by ignoring the costs of possible criminal charges brought by the SEC. Introducing these costs would shift the M(␣) curve up without changing its overall downward slope. Since the analysis relies on its downward slope, the qualitative results would remain the same if these costs were included in the analysis, although the parameter space over which * is nonzero would be reduced.
the owner is bankrupt. This is equivalent to a hybrid proportional rule where k ϭ 1. Given this parameterization, the equilibrium strategies under the JS and PP rules can be derived easily. When the damage apportionment rule changes, the investors' expected liability payments will also change in the state where the auditor is held liable and the owner is bankrupt. Under the JS rule, the investors will recover all of their economic losses, (P JS ϩ I), while under the PP rule, investors will only recover ␣(P PP ϩ I). The equivalent pricing equations under the JS and PP rules can be found by substituting ␣k ϭ 1 and k ϭ 1, respectively, into the HP pricing rule found in equation (5) above. Doing so yields the following pricing equations:
The damage apportionment rule also affects the liability payments that the auditor expects to make when there is an audit failure. This in turn changes the auditor's marginal benefit from audit quality. The equivalent optimal audit quality equations under the JS and PP rules can be found by substituting ␣k ϭ 1 and k ϭ 1, respectively, into the HP audit quality function found in equation (8) above. This yields the following optimal audit quality equations:
JS c
PP c p ϩ (1 Ϫ p)
Since the investors' pricing rule and the auditor's choice of audit quality change with the damage apportionment rule, the price of a firm with an audited high report will also change, ceteris paribus. This will change the low-type owner's expected benefits of misreporting. The expected costs of misreporting, M(␣), are the same under all three damage apportionment rules. Hence, the low-type owner is concerned only about the damage apportionment rule to the extent that it changes the price investors are willing to pay for a firm with a high audited report. Therefore, the reporting decision under the HP rule summarized in equation (11) also holds for the JS and PP rules, except that the conjectured price corresponds to the prevailing damage apportionment rule.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The equilibria in this model are unique and can be characterized by the low-type owner's reporting strategy: accurate reporting, interactive/mixed reporting, and misreporting. The equilibrium reporting strategy for the low-type owner will change from an accurate reporting strategy to an interactive reporting strategy to a misreporting strategy as ␣, the percentage of responsibility assigned to a liable auditor, increases.
16 When ␣ is small, the owner's expected costs of misreporting are relatively high because the owner will be held responsible for most of the damages. As ␣ increases, the expected misreporting costs decrease and the low-type owner will play a mixed reporting strategy. When the misreporting costs become small enough (that is, when ␣ becomes large enough), the low-type owner will never be deterred from misreporting because the net benefits from doing so are always positive. Define as the lowest value of ␣ where the expected costs of misreporting just equal j ␣ 1 the expected benefits in equilibrium under damage apportionment rule j; that is, j ␣ 1 ϭ min{␣͉M(␣) ϭ P j (␣)} for j ʦ {JS, HP, PP}. When ␣ Ͻ the low-type owner always j ␣ , 1 reports accurately, so audit failures do not occur. Given the absence of audit failures, investors bid up the price of the firm to the ''full insurance'' price, C H , under all three damage apportionment rules. The damage apportionment rule is irrelevant because there are never any damages to apportion. Since the expected benefits of misreporting, P j ϭ C H , and the expected costs, M(␣), are the same under all three damage apportionment rules, this implies that the lowest value of ␣ that sets them equal, is the same for all j. Henceforth, the an interactive reporting strategy, where the equilibrium value of is a function of ␣ and the damage apportionment rule. Recall that M(␣) is decreasing in ␣. The intuition behind why there is a range of ␣ that results in interactive equilibria is that the price is also decreasing at exactly the same rate as M(␣) throughout the range,
declines because the audit failure rate over this range is increasing by just enough to ensure that P j (␣) ϭ M(␣) (see Proposition 4). Essentially, is that value of ␣ where the probability 
it is the probability that a firm with a high audited report is actually of low type. 17 The audit failure rate is increasing in the probability of misreporting, , and decreasing in audit quality, q, ceteris paribus.
The differences among the three damage apportionment rules arise only in interactive and misreporting equilibria where audit failures, liable auditors and owner bankruptcy each occur with positive probability. I will first discuss the results for the misreporting equilibria as these are essentially equivalent to those settings analyzed in the auditor liability literature where the low-type owner follows a static reporting strategy, i.e., always reports high.
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This will be followed by the equivalent results for the interactive equilibria where the owner's reporting strategy interacts with and changes in response to the other players' strategies. Significant differences in the results arise when the owner's reporting strategy varies with the legal environment. These differences center on which damage apportionment rule results in the lowest audit failure rate.
Misreporting Analysis
The following comparisons can be made for misreporting equilibria. These comparisons can also be seen in figures 2 and 3, which show the players' strategies under each damage apportionment rule for all three types of equilibria. To ease the exposition, all increases or decreases should be considered strict unless otherwise noted. The proofs to all of the results can be found in appendix B. Let
Proposition 1: For ␣ Ͼ price, audit quality and the audit failure rate are ranked as ␣ , 2 follows: (I) P JS Ͼ P HP Ͼ P PP , (II) Ͼ Ͼ and (III) (1 Ϫ g JS ) q* q* q* ,
The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward because the owner is not an active player in the game. For a given ␣ and audit quality, investors will pay more for a firm under a damage apportionment rule that provides more owner insolvency insurance because the insurance increases their expected returns in the audit failure state. The amount of this insurance is highest under the JS rule and lowest under the PP rule. Additionally for a given ␣ and price, the auditor will supply more audit quality as the expected costs of an audit failure increase. These costs are increasing in the amount of owner insolvency insurance that the auditor is required to provide. These initial differences among the damage apportionment rules are compounded because price and audit quality act as strategic complements under misreporting equilibria. Higher prices lead to higher levels of audit quality because they increase the auditor's expected costs in the event of an audit failure. Likewise, higher levels of audit quality lead to higher prices because they increase the probability that the firm is actually of high type.
When audit quality is higher, the audit failure rate is strictly lower in misreporting equilibria because there are no changes in the owner's reporting strategy (i.e., is constant at 1) that could produce an offsetting effect. Thus, the damage apportionment rule that supplies the most (least) owner insolvency insurance, JS (PP), leads to the lowest (highest) audit failure rate in this setting.
Without specifying the audit cost function, c(q), definitive social welfare comparisons among the damage apportionment rules cannot be made under either misreporting or interactive equilibria. From a policy perspective then, a logical focus is on the audit failure rate. Audit failures involve other costs that are not included in the model. These costs are potentially quite large and include court costs, legal fees, and potentially lower trading volumes. In terms of the audit failure rate, the model's implications in a static reporting environment are clear: the more audit quality, the better. The negative relationship between the audit failure rate and the amount of owner bankruptcy insurance holds because the owner's reporting decision does not change with the damage apportionment rule in these equilibria.
Under the HP rule, an increase in the sharing parameter k effectively increases the amount of owner insolvency insurance that the auditor is required to provide. This serves to increase the amount of damages that the auditor expects to pay if an audit failure occurs. As stated in the following corollary, this produces effects similar to those described in Proposition 1. proportional rule leads to an increase in audit quality, an increase in the firm's price and a decrease in the audit failure rate. The intuition behind this result is the same as for Proposition 1: increasing the amount of owner insolvency insurance directly increases audit quality by increasing the auditor's expected marginal benefit from audit quality. It also raises the price by increasing the investors' expected payoff in the audit failure state. These initial increases in audit quality and price are reinforced because of their strategic complementarity. Since audit quality increases and there is no change in the amount of misreporting, the audit failure rate declines.
The next proposition examines what happens when the auditor is held responsible for a higher percentage of the damages in misreporting equilibria.
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Proposition 2: For ␣ Ͼ an increase in ␣ leads to an increase in audit quality, an ␣ , 2 increase in the firm's price and a decrease in the audit failure rate under all three damage apportionment rules.
As with an increase in the amount of owner insolvency insurance, an increase in ␣ has both a direct and indirect effect on audit quality and prices. It directly increases the level of audit quality by increasing the auditor's marginal benefit from audit quality holding price constant. It also directly increases the price that investors are willing to pay because it increases their expected litigation awards holding audit quality constant. These initial increases are indirectly reinforced because of the strategic complementarity between price and audit quality. Audit quality increases with price both because the total amount of damages has increased and because the liable auditor is being held responsible for a higher percentage of these damages. Price increases with audit quality both because the probability of an audit failure has decreased and the expected payoff in the event of an audit failure has increased.
The increase in audit quality increases the probability that the auditor detects an overstatement without changing the initial probability of an overstatement because the low-type owner's strategy is constant with respect to audit quality. Therefore, the increase in audit quality due to the increase in ␣ leads to a decrease in the probability of an audit failure. As shown in the next section, this intuition does not carry over to situations where the owner's reporting strategy varies with the damage apportionment rule.
Interactive Analysis
In those equilibria in which the owner's optimal strategy is a mixed one, the owner's expected cost of misreporting, M(␣), is the same under all three damage apportionment rules for a given ␣. Since the expected costs of misreporting have to equal the expected benefits of misreporting in order for the owner to be willing to play an interactive strategy, this implies that price as a function of ␣ must also be the same under all three rules; that is, P JS (␣) ϭ P HP (␣) ϭ P PP (␣).
Investors will bid up the firm's price as the damage apportionment rule mandates more owner insolvency insurance, ceteris paribus. Likewise, the auditor will respond by supplying more audit quality because greater amounts of owner insolvency insurance raise the expected costs of an audit failure. Since price and audit quality still act as strategic complements holding all else constant, these effects will reinforce one another. However, any price increase due to more owner insolvency insurance will simultaneously increase the owner's incentives to misreport since the net benefits, P Ϫ M(␣), would now be strictly positive. The resulting increase in the probability of misreporting reduces the firm's price by increasing the probability of an audit failure. In equilibrium, the likelihood of misreporting increases by just enough to counteract the upward pressure put on price by the higher levels of owner insolvency insurance.
This intuition demonstrates the main theme of this paper: a change in the damage apportionment rule not only changes the auditor's incentives, but simultaneously and inseparably changes the owner's reporting incentives. This inseparability occurs because the auditor's and owner's incentives are endogenously linked through the price investors are willing to pay for the firm. These changes in incentives impact the audit failure rate in opposite directions and, in equilibrium, the change in the owner's reporting strategy more than offsets the change in audit quality in terms of the reliability and accuracy of the financial statements.
The interactive equilibria comparisons for the three damage apportionment rules are summarized in the following proposition. Let ␣ 2 ϭ min
Proposition 3: For any ␣ 1 Ͻ ␣ Ͻ ␣ 2 , the audit failure rate, the probability of misreporting and audit quality are ranked as follows:
This proposition contains the main result of the paper. If the three damage apportionment rules are ranked on the basis of the audit failure rate they induce, then this ranking switches depending on whether the equilibria involve the low-type owner employing an interactive or a static reporting strategy. This reversal occurs despite the fact that under both types of equilibria, the JS rule leads to the highest level of audit quality and the PP rule leads to the lowest level. The difference comes from how the damage apportionment rule affects the owner's misreporting incentives in an interactive equilibrium: more owner insolvency insurance leads to more misreporting.
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This reversal in the ranking of the most policy-relevant variable in the paper demonstrates the importance of modeling the owner as an active player, especially in light of the evidence cited in the introduction regarding the interactive nature of the auditing/financial reporting relationship in practice. The model's implications for interactive equilibria are clear: the less misreporting the better. In terms of the damage apportionment rule, this translates into: the less owner insolvency insurance, the better. Thus, within the confines of the model, the PP rule is to be preferred to the HP rule which is to be preferred to the JS rule.
A small increase in the sharing parameter k under the HP rule produces a small increase in the amount of owner insolvency insurance, where ''small'' is defined so that the resulting equilibrium is still an interactive equilibrium. Thus, the effects and the intuition behind them are the same as those of Proposition 3, which analyzed the effects of relatively large changes in the amount of owner insolvency insurance. Since the expected costs of misreporting, M(␣), are invariant to k, the equilibrium price cannot change with k in an interactive equilibrium. Therefore, the increase in price that the change in k would otherwise induce must be just offset by an increase in the owner's probability of misreporting. The net result is an increase in the audit failure rate. the hybrid proportional rule leads to an increase in the audit failure rate, the probability of misreporting and audit quality.
This corollary continues the underlying theme of this paper: changing the incentives of the auditor by changing the amount of owner insolvency insurance the auditor provides simultaneously changes the owner's reporting incentives and that these changes affect the audit failure rate in opposite directions. This potential trade-off between the amount of misreporting and the quality of the audit has often been overlooked in debates concerning auditor liability and audit quality.
The next proposition describes what happens when there is a small increase in ␣.
Proposition 4: An increase in ␣ to ␣ ϩ ⌬␣ where ␣ 1 Ͻ ␣ ϩ ⌬␣ Ͻ ␣ 2 leads to an increase in the audit failure rate, the probability of misreporting and audit quality, and a decrease in price under all three damage apportionment rules.
When ␣ increases, the low-type owner's expected costs of misreporting decrease because the owner will be held responsible for a smaller percentage of the damages when the auditor is held liable. Therefore, the equilibrium price under an interactive equilibrium must also decline by the same amount in order for the owner to remain indifferent between the two reporting choices. The increase in ␣ will lead to an increase in price and audit quality, holding the owner's reporting strategy constant. In the new equilibrium, the amount of misreporting must increase by more than enough to offset the effects that the increase in ␣ and audit quality would otherwise have on price, so that the price will actually fall in equilibrium.
This result further demonstrates the importance of modeling the owner as an active player when the focus of the model is on the audit failure rate, and not just on audit quality. When the owner is a nonstrategic player, the audit failure rate is always decreasing with an increase in ␣ because the amount of misreporting is invariant to ␣.
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V. EXTENSIONS
The economic setting was kept relatively simple in order to facilitate the analysis and the presentation of the results. The purpose of this section is to discuss several possible extensions of the model. It is relatively straightforward to show that as long as the owner's expected costs of misreporting, M(␣), are monotonically decreasing in ␣, and the auditor's expected costs of an audit failure are increasing in both the amount of owner insolvency insurance provided and ␣, then the same qualitative results will be obtained. Extensions where these conditions are met include the introduction of uncertainty or business risk with respect to the firm's liquidating cash flows, a percentage of the damage awards going to class-action lawyers, pretrial settlements, and fractional recovery of damages.
The introduction of risk aversion for the owner and auditor should not change the nature of the underlying strategic interactions on which the qualitative results depend. When the owner is risk averse, M(␣) will continue to be strictly decreasing in ␣, but the slope will change. Risk aversion on the part of the auditor will increase the differences in audit quality among the damage apportionment rules. This occurs because increases in the amount of owner insolvency risk that the auditor bears will be met with even greater increases in audit quality than in the risk-neutral setting.
One could also extend the model by fully endogenizing the expected damage awards by characterizing the jury's expected behavior in terms of audit quality; that is, ␣ ϭ ␣(q) and ϭ (q).
22 Such an extension creates 12 additional parameters in the model (six values and their derivatives among the three damage apportionment rules). These new parameters introduce ambiguity into the results because of some ''second order'' effects that attenuate the differences among the legal regimes. At the expense of considerable mathematical complexity, sufficient conditions could be imposed that would eliminate this ambiguity so the results would remain qualitatively the same. Essentially, these conditions limit how responsive a jury is expected to be to changes in audit quality.
Note, however, that a contention upon which the current paper rests is that making the owner's reporting decision endogenous provides insights about alternative liability regimes that are not evident when the owner's reporting decision is exogenous. In the same light, future research may reveal additional insights about the effects of alternative liability regimes if the current model is expanded so that the probability of the auditor being held liable, , and the proportion of the damages for which a liable auditor will be held responsible, ␣, is allowed to depend upon audit quality.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes how owners, auditors and investors behave under three alternative damage apportionment rules that are currently in use throughout the world. The analysis takes place within an economic setting where the players' payoffs are endogenously determined and auditing improves social welfare by decreasing the amount of negative NPV investments that are undertaken. The analysis contributes to the auditor liability literature by focusing on the crucial role that the owner's reporting strategy has on the results. Specifically, I find that when the owner plays a mixed reporting strategy, changes in the damage apportionment rule that increase the level of audit quality simultaneously increase the probability of misreporting by the owner. The net result of these two changes is an increase in the audit failure rate.
This finding, which is new to the auditor liability literature, is consistent with the observation that the accuracy of the financial statements is primarily the responsibility of management and auditors have only a secondary ''quality control'' role. This paper demonstrates the importance of recognizing the impact that damage apportionment rules have on both the auditor and the owner when debating their relative merits. This latter effect has often been overlooked in policy debates concerning auditor liability.
The level of audit quality is always highest (lowest) under the JS (PP) rule. However, the rank order of the damage apportionment rules in terms of the audit failure rate reverses itself depending on whether the owner employs a constant or a mixed reporting strategy. For equilibria where the owner plays a mixed reporting strategy, the PP (JS) rule leads to the lowest (highest) audit failure rate and vice versa for equilibria where the owner always misreports. The hybrid proportional rule leads to an intermediate level of audit quality and audit failures under both types of equilibria.
The mixed reporting results are important for two reasons. First, empirical, experimental and practitioner evidence suggests that reporting strategies in the real world are influenced by auditing strategies and vice versa. Second, investors, regulators and auditors are primarily concerned with the audit failure rate rather than with audit quality per se. These results are likely to be of interest to state regulators and policy makers in the United Kingdom and other countries who are currently debating the merits of switching from a joint-and-several to a proportional damage apportionment rule.
APPENDIX A NOTATION
␣ ϭ percentage of responsibility the jury assigns to the auditor (0 Ͻ ␣ Ͻ 1). ϭ probability that the jury holds the auditor liable for an audit failure. ϭ the low-type owner's reporting strategy, where the owner misreports with probability and reports accurately with probability (1 Ϫ ). b ϭ the probability that the owner is bankrupt at the end of the trial. c(q) ϭ the auditor's incremental cost of providing audit quality q. C T ϭ the end-of-period liquidating cash flow of a type T firm. g ϭ the probability that an audited high report is accurate in equilibrium. (1 Ϫ g) ϭ the equilibrium audit failure rate.
k ϭ the proportional damage multiplier under a HP rule (1 Ͻ k Ͻ 1/␣). k ϭ 1 under a PP rule and k ϭ 1/␣ under a JS rule. M(␣) ϭ the low-type owner's expected costs of misreporting. p ϭ the ex ante probability that a firm is of high type. P j ϭ the firm's price under damage apportionment rule j, j ʦ {JS, HP, PP}. q ϭ the equilibrium level of audit quality (q Յ q Յ 1). Quality is defined as the probability that a material misstatement is detected if one exists. T ʦ {H, L} ϭ value of the firm's assets (its type) where H ϭ high and L ϭ low. T ʦ {Ĥ , L } ϭ owner's report to the auditor where Ĥ ϭ ''high'' and L ϭ ''low.'' t ʦ {â, û} ϭ auditor's opinion on T where â ϭ ''adverse'' and û ϭ ''unqualified.'' APPENDIX B PROOFS The proofs rely on how optimal audit quality responds to changes in several other variables. It will be useful to show these now. Equations (14), (8) and (15) characterize the auditor's optimal choice of audit quality under the JS, HP and PP rules, respectively. I claim that optimal audit quality is continuously increasing in P, ␣ and for all three rules and in k under the HP rule, ceteris paribus. Let F j (␣, j , P j ) equal the RHS of the optimal audit quality equations (14), (8) and (15) for j ʦ {JS, HP, PP}. Thus, cЈ( j , P j )) ϭ q*(␣, j F j (␣, j , P j ). Then, ѨcЈ( (␣, j , P j ))/Ѩ␣ ϭ [ѨcЈ( (␣, j , P j ))/Ѩ ] ⅐ [ (␣, j , P j )/Ѩ␣] ϭ q* q* q* Ѩq* j j j j ѨF j (␣, j , P j )/Ѩ␣ Ͼ 0. Since cЈ(q) is an increasing function of q, this implies that (␣, Ѩq* j j , P j )/Ѩ␣ Ͼ 0. Since the partial derivatives of F j with respect to P j and j are also both positive and the partial derivative of F HP with respect to k is also positive, the rest of the claim can be shown similarly.
Lemma 1a:
Յ When either is in the interior, the inequality is strict. (8) and (15) (5) and (13) imply that q* q* .
HP PP P HP Ͼ P PP . Case 3: Suppose P HP ϭ P PP . Then the optimal audit quality equations (8) and (15) . Then the optimal audit quality equations (8) and (15) and both pricing equations are continuous in ␣. However, by case 3, P HP P PP which implies that P HP P PP and by extension, When * ϭ 1, the audit failure rate / Յ q* / Յ q* . (8) implies that when price is held constant, optimal audit quality is increasing in k. Additionally, it implies that when k is held constant, optimal audit quality is increasing in price. The investors' pricing equation (5) shows that holding audit quality constant, price is increasing in k and that holding k constant, price is increasing in audit quality. Taken together, these show that both equilibrium audit quality and price are strictly increasing with k. Additionally, when ϭ 1, the audit failure rate, (1 * HP Ϫ g), is strictly decreasing in audit quality.
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Proposition 2: When ␣ Ͼ ϭ ϭ ϭ1. The optimal audit quality equations ␣ , * * * 2 J S H P P P (8), (14) and (15) imply that when price is held constant, optimal audit quality is increasing in ␣. Additionally, they imply that when ␣ is held constant, optimal audit quality is increasing in price. The investors' pricing equations (5), (12) and (13) show that holding audit quality constant, price is increasing in ␣ and that holding ␣ constant, price is increasing in audit quality. Taken together, these show that equilibrium audit quality and price are strictly increasing in ␣ under all three rules. Additionally, the audit failure rate, (1 Ϫ g), is strictly decreasing in audit quality.
Proposition 3: HP vs. JS: For any ␣ 1 Ͻ ␣ Ͻ ␣ 2 , P JS ϭ P HP ϭ M(␣). Since (b Ϫ ␣bk) Ͼ (b Ϫ b), the investors' pricing equations (12) and (5) imply that g HP Ͼ g JS , which implies that (1 Ϫ g JS ) Ͼ (1 Ϫ g HP ).
This in turn implies that (1 Ϫ Ͻ
(1 Ϫ At P JS
